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OVERSTEPPING: U.S. IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND THE
POWER TO DEVELOP THE RECORD
JAYANTH K. KRISHNAN*
In 1952, Congress established a new federal position to be filled by
“special inquiry officers” charged with overseeing deportation cases. These
immigration judges—as they eventually came to be called—were assigned to
work within the executive branch, namely, the Department of Justice, and they
were to be answerable ultimately to a political appointee, the attorney general.
Importantly, they received specific statutory authority allowing them to
“develop the record” during an immigration case. This power enabled
immigration judges to assemble evidence and call, “interrogate, examine, and
cross‑examine . . . any witnesses.”
Given that many immigrants who appear in immigration court do so pro
se, it is certainly understandable why Congress believed arming the judge with
this power would be beneficial. After all, in the absence of counsel, who else
might safeguard these immigrants’ interests? Moreover, the federal courts have
uniformly found this statute to be legally valid and normatively valuable as
well.
But assume that the immigrant has a lawyer. Should the immigration
judge still be able to develop the record in the same way? On this question, the
federal courts have not reached a consensus. This Article argues that the
answer should be no and proposes an approach to address this situation—one
that allows the lawyer and immigrant-client to opt out of having the
immigration judge intervene. The analytical model offered here is especially
necessary at this moment because, given the intense political pressure on
immigration judges, they frequently overstep and encroach upon the lawyerclient relationship, often adversely affecting the immigrant’s legal
representation.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine a scenario in which an undocumented immigrant is
appearing in front of a judge responsible for determining whether this
immigrant can stay in the United States. The immigrant speaks little
English and is seeking asylum—but has no lawyer. The government,
however, is moving to deport, claiming that the individual has committed
an aggravated felony, which is typically a barrier to gaining asylum.1
This story will hardly sound remarkable to anyone familiar with the
U.S. deportation process.2 Formally known today as a “removal”
proceeding, this situation is complicated even more so by the fact that the
presiding judge works within the Department of Justice (DOJ) rather than
as an Article III adjudicator.3 Given that the prosecution of the immigrant
is also conducted by officials from another executive branch office—the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—it is not difficult to see why
many critics view the removal process as heavily tilted in favor of the
government.4

1.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
2.
For excellent discussions on asylum in the U.S., see, for example, JAYA
RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE:
DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009); Stephen
Meili, Asylum Under Attack: Is It Time for a Constitutional Right?, 26 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 147 (2020).
3.
For work on this point, see generally Jayanth K. Krishnan, Judicial Power –
Immigration Style, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 317 (2021), which also notes that observers have
alternatively called upon Congress to make immigration judges Article I adjudicators. See
also Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635
(2010) (advocating for converting immigration judges into administrative law judges with
more independence); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 383–87 (2006) (discussing the lack of judicial independence in
deportation cases); ABA Signs Joint Letter to Congress on Establishing an Independent
BAR
ASS’N
(July
9,
2019),
Immigration
Court
System,
AM.
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/07/aba-signs-jointletter-to-congress-on-establishing-an-independen/ (noting that immigration judges have an
“inherent conflict of interest” because they report to the United States Attorney General);
Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n, It’s Time for Immigration Court Reform, YOUTUBE (Jan. 31,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=8fkt-g4XG_A&feature=
emb_logo [https://perma.cc/X6PL-P63M] (noting the “fundamental flaw of having a court
system that is structured within the Justice Department”).
4.
For discussion of this point, see sources cited supra note 3. See also
Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 17–19 (2018);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the
Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39,
40–42 (2013); Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United States:
Why Is There No Will to Make It an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17, 29–30 (2013);
Dana Leigh Marks, Opinion, I’m an Immigration Judge: Here’s How We Can Fix Our
Courts, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/im-animmigration-judge-heres-how-we-can-fix-our-courts/2019/04/12/76afe914-5d3e-11e9a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4KC-F2TH]; Kevin R. Johnson, An

2022:57

Overstepping: U.S. Immigration Judges

59

Sticking with this above scenario, consider that according to a 1996
amendment to the main immigration statute, the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),5 the immigration judge is under a legal obligation
to engage in what might be thought of as “active judging.”6 The judge is
required to “administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine,
and cross‑examine the [noncitizen] and any witnesses.”7 This same
statutory provision also states that “[t]he immigration judge may issue
subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.”8
An appellate body within the DOJ known as the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) oversees the immigration judge.9 Since 1997,
the BIA has held that this statute places a responsibility upon the
immigration judge to ensure that all relevant information is made available
to the noncitizen as part of the proceeding.10 Similarly, there is “broad
consensus” among the federal appellate courts11—which hear appeals
from the BIA12—that when the noncitizen does not have a lawyer,
“immigration judges have a legal duty to fully develop the record in the
cases that come before them.”13
The rationale underlying this position is that the immigration judge is
assumed to be the official best able to seek out the truth and provide a just

Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394, 2399–2402
(2012).
5.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537.
6.
Linda M. Harris, The One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of the Immigration
Court Backlog, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1185, 1242 n.250 (referencing Anna E. Carpenter,
Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2017)).
7.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 589 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)).
8.
Id.
9.
See Krishnan, supra note 3, at 322–23.
10.
See In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727–30 (BIA 1997). However, “the
applicant does not prevail by default” if the judge fails to perform this duty. Id. at 730 n.3.
Also, immigration adjudication falls fully within the DOJ’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review. See Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev., About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office [https://perma.cc/DF5M-S6YK] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2022).
11.
See Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 626 (4th Cir. 2021).
12.
The particular federal circuit court of appeals to which a BIA case is
appealed is based on the jurisdiction where the original immigration court hearing took
place. See Krishnan, supra note 3, at 323; see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Immigrant
Struggle for Effective Counsel: An Empirical Assessment, 2022 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming).
13.
Quintero, 998 F.3d at 626; see also John R. Mills, Kristen M. Echemendia
& Stephen Yale-Loehr, “Death Is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 365–66 (2009). Cf. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice:
The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York
City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 659–62 (2006).
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outcome, both for the unrepresented noncitizen and the government.14 But
it is undeniable that there are competing pressures that the immigration
judge faces.15 One observer has noted that “[t]he immigration judge is
required to walk a fine line . . . [with] the special obligation to develop the
record more directly when the applicant appears pro se.”16
What happens, though, when a noncitizen comes before an
immigration judge and has a lawyer? Here, consensus among the federal
appellate courts is lacking. As the Fourth Circuit recently commented,
“[S]ome circuits have deemed . . . [the] duty to develop the record to be
generally applicable regardless of whether the noncitizen is represented by
counsel, [while] others have recognized it only in the pro se context . . .
.”17
The Fourth Circuit itself has found that the immigration judge must
fulfill the duty to develop the record, even when the noncitizen has a

14.
See discussion infra Part II; see also Christina P. Greer, Note, Safeguards
for Mentally Disabled Respondents in Removal Proceedings, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. &
MED. 279, 283, 302–03 (2013).
15.
See Greer, supra note 14, at 283; see also Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx
Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1482 (2019) (noting how the Trump administration
“imposed a controversial quota system on immigration judges tied to annual performance
reviews, which could be expected to encourage the judges to close cases by ordering
removals”).
16.
See Scott Rempell, Credibility Assessments and the REAL ID Act’s
Amendments to Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 185, 220 (2008); see also Russell
Engler, And Justice for All––Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1988–90 (1999); Deborah L.
Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 870 (2009);
David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah, Time, Due Process, and Representation: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
1823, 1840 n.75 (2016); Alice Clapman, Hearing Difficult Voices: The Due Process Rights
of Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373, 397–
99 (2011); Brent S. Wible, The Strange Afterlife of Section 212(c) Relief: Collateral
Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After St. Cyr, 19 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 488–89 (2005).
17.
See Quintero, 998 F.3d at 626–27 (noting that these pro se-only circuits have
not “expressly rul[ed] out the possibility of a general duty”). The Quintero court further
delineated the circuit court split:
Some circuits have deemed this duty to be generally applicable in all
immigration court proceedings. See, e.g., Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 55
(2d Cir. 2006); Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2004). Others
have recognized it only in cases involving pro se respondents, although none
of those courts has expressly foreclosed the possibility of a general duty. See,
e.g., Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464–65 (8th Cir. 2004); Jacinto v.
INS, 208 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2000). Then there are some circuits that have
not specified whether the duty applies generally or only in the pro se context.
See, e.g., Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 129–30 & n.14 (1st Cir. 2004);
Toure v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 622–23 n.8.
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lawyer.18 The question this Article seeks to answer is whether this position
is correct. In evaluating this issue, the thesis put forth below is that there
must be a re-imagination of the immigration judge’s duty toward a
noncitizen when that noncitizen is represented by a lawyer.19 Resolving
this issue in an equitable and just manner is vital because how the
immigration proceeding functions goes to the very heart of the
noncitizen’s liberty interest—namely, whether that individual can have an
opportunity to live within the United States.20
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a history and
overview of the circuit split that presently exists on this subject. Parts II
and III are the core of this study. To begin, there will be an examination
of the way the executive branch’s Social Security Administration (SSA)
conducts judicial proceedings. As this discussion will show, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) at an SSA hearing wears multiple hats,
serving as an adjudicator but also as an inquisitional court officer,
investigator, and at times as an advocate for the claimant bringing the case,
even when the claimant has a lawyer.21 Raising this comparison is
necessary because several federal courts of appeals have likened the role
of this ALJ to that of the immigration judge and have found that because
the ALJ has a duty to develop the record in all instances, the immigration
judge has such a duty as well.22
As this Article shows, however, this analysis overlooks an important
reality. For one, immigration judges (IJs) are not the same as ALJs
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act.23 Rather, immigration
judges are “Article II adjudicators”24 whom “the Attorney General
appoints . . . [and who are] subject to such supervision and shall perform
such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.”25 Certainly, under the
DOJ’s guidelines, immigration judges are expected to “exercise their
independent judgment and discretion” and act “in a timely and impartial
manner.”26 But given their position and the highly charged nature of
immigration politics today, to mandate that they must fulfill the duty to
develop the record when a noncitizen is represented by counsel worries

18.
See id. at 626–27.
19.
In fact, one study that discusses why rethinking this issue is crucial,
especially because immigration judges are understaffed and overworked, is Andrew TaeHyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581 (2013).
20.
For an important book on how the immigration process needs to be fair and
equitable, see HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014).
21.
For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part II.
22.
See infra pp. 74–76.
23.
For a discussion of this point, see Krishnan, supra note at 3, at 325.
24.
Id. (noting that this is “common parlance”).
25.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4)).
26.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2021).
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many immigrant-rights advocates who fear judicial bias in favor of the
government.
Of course, to cast all immigration judges as acting contrary to the
interests of the immigrant and their lawyer would be unfair.27 At the same
time, it would be naïve and unrealistic to think that politics is completely
absent within the immigration courtroom.28 Thus, recognizing the
complexity and nuance involved and reflecting on what the judicial duty
to develop the record should be when a noncitizen has counsel, this Article
proposes an alternative approach that will be referred to as LODE—
Lawyer Opt-Out with Discretionary Evaluation.29
At the heart of this model is the notion that noncitizens, through their
representative counsel, can “opt out” of receiving judicial assistance.
There may be various reasons for an opt-out request. For example, the
lawyer and noncitizen may believe that such assistance is unnecessary
because the representing lawyer has the requisite expertise. Or the two
may be worried about the judge’s temperament or reputation for being
“pro-government.” Or, because there is an established, trusted relationship
already present, the noncitizen simply may not wish to have anyone but
the lawyer develop the record.30
Yet the LODE model also contemplates the scenario in which the
lawyer handling the case is underperforming but nevertheless is
encouraging or even pressuring the noncitizen to opt out.31 In this type of
situation and after evaluating the circumstances, the judge, under the

27.
For an excellent treatment of the immigration prosecutor (who works within
the Department of Homeland Security), see Sivaprasad Wadhia, supra note 4.
28.
There have been decades of research on how and to what extent attitudes,
ideology, and politics shape judicial decision-making. For a brief sampling, see, for
example, Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2017 (2016) (providing a review of the literature); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight,
Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 11 (2013); JEFFREY A. SEGAL
& HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
(2002); CHARLES G. GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN JUDICIARY (2016); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
(1998); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW
ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M.
Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 305 (2002).
29.
For a discussion of this model, see infra Section III.B.
30.
See infra pp. 76–79. It should be noted that, not infrequently, a judge’s
development of the record may involve more benign, pro forma-type aspects, including
adding various government reports to the file. I am grateful to Sean Santen for this point.
31.
For a discussion of “Judicial Controls over Adversarial Abuses,” see
generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, DAVID LUBAN, SCOTT L. CUMMINGS & NORA FREEMAN
ENGSTROM, LEGAL ETHICS ch. 7 (8th ed. 2020).
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LODE approach, could intervene as a means of safeguarding the
noncitizen’s interests.32
Again, such discretionary evaluative authority may concern those
who fear the potential for excessive judicial interference. But as the Article
explains below, there would be a check.33 While this model would not
prohibit the immigration judge from asking clarifying questions or
shepherding the process along in an efficient but fair manner, any detailed,
substantive intervention beyond that would be allowed only after receiving
permission from an overseeing Article III appellate court.34
Additionally, a practical, self-enforcing check also would be present.
Immigration judges are so overwhelmed with cases on their dockets that
they simply do not have the time, capacity, or desire to expend extra
energy where it is not needed.35 Adopting the LODE approach, therefore,
would offer a welcome respite to the already overworked immigration
judge; judicial intervention would likely be triggered only where there is
obvious, incontrovertible neglect by the noncitizen’s lawyer.36
Undoubtedly, there will be a range of potential questions observers
will ask regarding the LODE model. The end of this Article addresses
these queries, including what the standard of review should be when the
immigration judge asks the federal appellate court for approval to develop
the record. As the final part of this argument makes clear, federal appellate
courts generally should employ de novo review.37 That these requests
would be scrutinized closely seems only appropriate given that the
personal liberty of some of society’s most vulnerable individuals is at
stake.

32.
Id. (drawing upon the notion that the judge may need to intervene when
witnessing bad lawyering).
33.
For a discussion of this point in the model, see infra pp. 81–83.
34.
See infra pp. 82–83.
35.
See, e.g., C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 636 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he volume of cases on an IJ’s docket severely limits the IJ’s capacity to
develop the record.”).
36.
See infra p. 87 (discussing the frequency with which immigration judges will
actually have to seek appellate review to intervene in cases of inept lawyering).
37.
For a discussion of this point in further detail, see infra note 190 and
accompanying text.
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I. THE JUDGE’S DUTY TO DEVELOP THE RECORD—EVEN WHEN A
LAWYER IS PRESENT
A. The Affirmative Case

In 2004, the Seventh Circuit issued a well-known immigration
judgment in the case of Hasanaj v. Ashcroft.38 The facts involved an
Albanian citizen (Hasanaj) who sought asylum and withholding of
deportation because he feared persecution for his political opinions if he
were returned home.39 Both the immigration judge and the BIA rejected
his petition.40 In the immigration court, Hasanaj was represented by
counsel,41 but the judge nevertheless played an active role in overseeing
the case.42 Hasanaj claimed that this judicial involvement was excessive
and violated his due process rights.43 As the Seventh Circuit summarized,
Hasanaj’s argument was “that the IJ’s conduct during questioning
amounted to ‘hectoring, pressuring or abusing the witness . . . abandoning
all appearance of impartiality.’”44
Furthermore, according to Hasanaj and his lawyer, the immigration
judge’s interference prevented the lawyer from being able to put forth an
effective case.45 For example, during the hearing the lawyer began to
question her client “about the current conditions in Albania.”46 The lawyer
wanted to offer context, from Hasanaj’s perspective, as to how dangerous
it would be for Hasanaj to return.47 As the direct examination began,
however, “the IJ stated that he would give little weight to such testimony
as an authoritative historical account.”48
For the Seventh Circuit, the immigration judge’s decision was not
unreasonable.49 As the court noted, the judge did allow the testimony to
go forward and was simply previewing his analysis before handing down
38.
385 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2004).
39.
Id. at 781.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 784. The lawyer was Marketa Lindt, who currently is a partner in the
Chicago office of Sidley Austin LLP. See Marketa Lindt, SIDLEY,
https://www.sidley.com/en/people/l/lindt-marketa [https://perma.cc/XE4D-CWL3] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2022). According to Lindt’s LinkedIn page, she started at Sidley in 1999.
Marketa Lindt, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/marketa-lindt-033a579 (last
visited Feb. 5, 2022). The court also noted that Lindt represented Hasanaj from 1997 to
1998. Hasanaj, 385 F.3d at 784–85.
42.
Hasanaj, 385 F.3d at 783–85.
43.
Id. at 783.
44.
Id. at 783–84.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 784.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
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a ruling.50 Moreover, the judge rightly supplemented the lawyer’s
questions with his own.51 The judge’s interrogation of the alternative
possibilities Hasanaj could have taken to better secure his safety and the
immigration judge’s probing on other factual issues were justifiable and
complied with the statutory requirement to “develop the record
[completely] . . . in order to make a fully informed decision.”52 Thus,
because there was not “substantial evidence”53 showing that the
immigration judge abused his discretion, the Seventh Circuit agreed that
Hasanaj should be deported.54
Two years later, in Islam v. Gonzales,55 the Second Circuit similarly
examined the role of the immigration judge where a lawyer was present.
As in Hasanaj, the petitioner sought asylum and withholding of
deportation.56 The petitioner’s claim was that if sent back to his home
country of Bangladesh, he would be persecuted for his political opinions.57
The Second Circuit opened its decision by directly addressing the
responsibilities of an immigration judge.58 It observed that the
immigration judge “is not merely the fact finder and adjudicator, but also
has an obligation to establish and develop the record.”59 Yet this
responsibility does not mean that the judge can abandon their role as “a
neutral, impartial arbiter.”60 Interestingly, throughout its discussion, the
Second Circuit did not question whether there might be a conflict in trying
to satisfy both objectives.61
But then consider how, in this particular case, the court proceeded to
issue a harsh rebuke of the way the immigration judge had carried out his
duties.62 In essence, the judge was found to have crossed the line by
exhibiting contemptuous behavior and using demeaning language toward
the petitioner.63 By engaging “in an argumentative, sarcastic, impolite, and
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. (noting that the judge was both “thorough and fair in his obligation to the
Petitioner”).
53.
Id. at 781 (citing Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2004)).
54.
Id. at 785.
55.
469 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2006).
56.
Id. at 54. The petitioner also sought protection under the Convention against
Torture. Id.
57.
Id. at 55–56 n.1.
58.
Id. at 55.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. (“During the course of developing a sound and useful record, an IJ must,
when appropriate, question an applicant in order, for example, to probe inconsistencies and
develop the relevant facts. But it is precisely because of the IJ’s responsibility to develop
the record during asylum proceedings that the IJ must remain impartial.”).
62.
Id.
63.
Id. 55–56.
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overly hostile manner that went beyond fact-finding and questioning,”64
the judge all but became the second prosecuting arm of the government.
In fact, the lawyer for the petitioner went on record to state, “I believe that
. . . a hostile environment was created here today where by [sic] my client
was intimidated and maybe prevented from fully testifying completely as
to his . . . grounds for asylum.”65
Ultimately, the Second Circuit remanded the case and ordered that a
new immigration judge hear the matter.66 In reaching its conclusion, the
court noted that it typically reviews such cases by looking at whether there
is substantial evidence that the judge erred on the reading of the facts;
otherwise the court defers.67 In this case, however, the court opted to
conduct a de novo review because questions involving both law and fact
were involved and because, according to the court, the judge had a history
of belligerence.68
In both the Seventh and Second Circuit cases, the respective
petitioners complained that the presiding immigration judges intervened
too aggressively, resulting in unfair and unconstitutional hearings.69 And
while the outcomes differed between the two circuits, the commitment to
having immigration judges engage in active adjudication was kept firmly
in place.70 Put differently, both courts remained wedded to the principle
that the immigration judge always had a duty to develop the record, even
64.
Id. at 55.
65.
Id. at 56 n.2.
66.
Id. at 57.
67.
Id. at 55.
68.
Id. at 55–56. In an essay published in 2010, Professor Mark Hurwitz
documented how the appellate court subsequently “took the extraordinary step of removing
two immigration judges from cases for evincing inappropriate behavior and conduct
towards asylum seekers in their courts.” Mark S. Hurwitz, Removing Judges: The Cases of
Immigration Judges Jeffrey Chase and Noel Ferris, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 114, 114 (2010). One
of the judges was this particular judge, Jeffrey Chase. Id. at 114–15. In Islam, the Second
Circuit bluntly stated that “[u]nfortunately, this is not the first time that the courtroom
conduct of IJ Chase has been later questioned by this Court. By our count, this is the
seventh time that we have criticized IJ Chase’s conduct during hearings.” Islam, 469 F.3d
at 56. For a narrative on Chase that includes a more sympathetic account on his behalf, see
Nina Bernstein, U.S. Relieves Judge of Duties in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/nyregion/13judge.html
[https://perma.cc/AE562MV5].
69.
See Hasanaj v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 780, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2004); see also
Islam, 469 F.3d at 55–56.
70.
For cases in other circuits where this issue was litigated, see Handoko v. Att’y
Gen., 260 F. App’x 519, 521 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the noncitizen’s claim that the
immigration judge excessively interrupted the proceeding and deprived the noncitizen of
due process); Thu v. Ashcroft, 103 F. App’x 56, 57 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the argument
that the immigration judge was biased, “[e]ven though [he] frequently interrupted Thu’s
counsel and ultimately asked a majority of the questions”). For two other similar types of
cases, see Sharan v. Wilkinson, 850 F. App’x 878, 880 (5th Cir. 2021) and AriasHernandez v. Sessions, 685 F. App’x 372, 374–75 (6th Cir. 2017).
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when there was a lawyer, and that failure to comply with that duty would
result in the case being remanded.71
Then, there was a series of other cases in which the appeals were
based on how the immigration judges did not intervene enough on behalf
of the noncitizens represented by counsel. In these matters, the noncitizens
stipulated that the immigration judges had the power to intercede during
the proceedings but that the judges did not fulfill this statutory obligation.
In other words, the noncitizens affirmatively sought help from the judges
but claimed that the judges did not provide sufficient assistance. In
reviewing these petitions, the circuit courts have reached varying
conclusions. For example, in Pramanik v. Attorney,72 the Third Circuit
rejected the noncitizen’s claim that the immigration judge was too lax in
developing the record; according to the appellate court, the immigration
judge steered the proceeding in an appropriate direction.73 The noncitizen
had “counsel [who] was not prevented from asking additional non-leading
questions to present new facts.”74 The simple fact that the noncitizen did
not like the outcome and wished that the immigration judge had done more
to develop the record did not mean that the judge necessarily should have
done so.75
By contrast, in Zolotukhin v. Gonzales,76 the Ninth Circuit chastised
the immigration judge for not being active enough in developing the
record.77 There, the judge refused to call certain witnesses, ask about
particular legal claims, and amass vital pieces of evidence.78 The appellate
court was concerned about the excessive deference given to the
government’s prosecutors and “that the IJ was not acting as a fair and
impartial arbiter.”79 The court thus remanded the case for a new hearing.80

71.
See Hasanaj, 385 F.3d at 783, 785; see also Islam, 469 F.3d at 55–57.
72.
822 F. App’x 69 (3d Cir. 2020).
73.
Id. at 73.
74.
Id.
75.
See id. at 73–74 (“The IJ acted properly in instructing Petitioner’s counsel
not to ask leading questions of his own witnesses . . . [and although] Petitioner points to
the IJ’s alleged ‘failure to develop the record’ as prejudicial, he has not explained why the
IJ’s actions, specifically, affected the outcome of the proceedings.”). For similar outcomes
involving noncitizens represented by counsel, see Martinez Soriano v. Holder, 366 F.
App’x 733, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2010); Zhong Zheng v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 222 F. App’x
22, 23 (2d Cir. 2007); Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 148 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that the immigration judge’s duty to develop the record is satisfied by making sure “to
identify and probe perceived inconsistencies”).
76.
417 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
77.
Id. at 1075–76.
78.
Id. at 1075–77.
79.
Id. at 1075 n.2.
80.
Id. at 1077.
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In an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Shoafera v. I.N.S.,81 the court found
that the immigration judge similarly did not act with enough care.82 In this
matter, an Ethiopian citizen filed for asylum, claiming that she had a wellfounded fear of being sexually assaulted upon return to Ethiopia based on
her Amharic ethnicity.83 After she testified about these fears, the judge
explicitly stated that he would disregard her claims because they were too
speculative.84 The appellate court criticized the judge for not providing a
substantive explanation, on the record, for why he made this
determination; the court thereafter remanded the case.85
Thus, in situations in which the immigration judge has acted too
brazenly or not vigorously enough, the appellate courts have not hesitated
to remand the matter for reconsideration. Nevertheless, these decisions
also illustrate an underlying acceptance of, and deference toward, the
INA’s provision requiring the immigration judge to develop the record
during the course of an immigration hearing. The law itself is assumed to
be fundamentally protective of the noncitizen’s interests and rights. And
where there is a problem, the problem is considered to be, not with the law,
but instead with judges who exhibit bias or laxness.
But, this standard analysis fails to recognize an important reality: the
open-ended way that the law has been written too readily invites bias and
hostility or, alternatively, inaction, which demonstrates that the line
between the language in the statute and the judge’s behavior is in fact more
blurred than stark.
B. Cause for Concern?
To this last point above, occasionally an appellate court will express
worry about the broad powers the developing-the-record statute grants
immigration judges. For example, in the well-known case of Jacinto v.
I.N.S.,86 the Ninth Circuit issued a remand order in a case in which an
immigration judge had refused to grant asylum to a Guatemalan citizen.87
The facts were straightforward: The unrepresented petitioner spoke little
English and was unfamiliar with the immigration hearing process.88 As the
transcript from the proceeding showed, the judge repeatedly interrupted
the petitioner, was rude, and did not allow her to offer evidence to support

81.
228 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000).
82.
See id. at 1076.
83.
Id. at 1072, 1074–75.
84.
Id. at 1075.
85.
Id. at 1075–76.
86.
208 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2000). The petitioner also asked for withholding and
voluntary departure. Id. at 727. The BIA had affirmed the immigration judge’s order. Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 735.
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her claims.89 For the Ninth Circuit, the judge failed to satisfy his obligation
under the statute to properly develop the record on the petitioner’s behalf.90
The appellate court held that because of the judge’s behavior, “Jacinto did
not receive a full and fair hearing, . . . she suffered prejudice, and thus was
denied due process.”91
A similar set of circumstances occurred in a case involving an El
Salvadorian soccer player looking to “escape violence at the hands of the
notorious Mara Salvatrucha gang, commonly known as MS13.”92 The
petitioner in this case had asked for asylum, withholding, and Conventionagainst-Torture protection.93 And just as there was pressure from the judge
in Jacinto, here, too, according to the Third Circuit, hostility permeated
this hearing.94
For example, the Salvadorian petitioner did not have a lawyer, but
instead of providing him with legal assistance as she was statutorily
obliged to do, the immigration judge did the opposite.95 The judge
exhibited bias, did not permit the petitioner to present his testimony in full,
insulted him, and rushed through the proceeding.96 In effect, the judge
developed the record in a way most favorable to the government. Citing
its earlier precedent as support,97 the Third Circuit ruled that the
petitioner’s due process rights had been violated, finding that
the pervasiveness and egregiousness of the other problematic
conduct here––the IJ’s interrupting and cabining SerranoAlberto to “yes or no” answers during critical testimony, honing
in on various and sundry irrelevant details, making findings
contradicted by the record, and maintaining a condescending and
belligerent tone throughout the hearing . . . ––evinced bias and
created an intolerable atmosphere of intimidation.98
Both of these cases illustrate the real-life consequences of overly
aggressive immigration judges flaunting their power and flouting their
duty to be fair, just, and thoughtful adjudicators. It is hardly a stretch to
89.
Id. at 728, 731–32 (noting that petitioner also was not advised that “she could
be a witness for” her son who also was facing removal).
90.
Id. at 733–35.
91.
Id. at 735 (ruling “not [to] decide the merits of Jacinto’s application for
asylum”).
92.
See Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2017).
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 214–19.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 221–23 (citing Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 269–71 (3d Cir.
2005), Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 690–91 (3d Cir. 2006), and, for contrast,
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587 (3d Cir. 2003)).
98.
Id. at 224 (citation omitted).
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think that the INA, which gives these judges the power to develop the
record, emboldened them to behave in ways that worked a great disservice
to the noncitizens who appeared in their courtrooms. Fortunately for these
particular petitioners, the circuit courts of appeals served as the necessary
backstops and rectified the abuses that had occurred. But just how much
judicial malpractice has gone uncorrected?
In the Third Circuit’s view, many “IJs diligently comport with their
constitutional and statutory obligations, and . . . it is only on rare occasion
that . . . an IJ’s conduct crosses the line.”99 When it comes to pro se
petitioners, if the choice is between no judicial assistance or providing
such petitioners the opportunity to receive sound judicial assistance (with
the chance that the judge will overstep on occasion), the choice is an easy
one for the Third Circuit to make.
But should this calculus be the same when a noncitizen has counsel?
From the previous Section, we know that the presence of a lawyer will not
always deter bad judicial behavior. Another recent and pronounced
example is that of former judge Nicholas Ford.100 Ford was “a criminal
court judge in Cook County, Illinois, before being named to the [San
Francisco] immigration court bench in 2019 by then-Attorney General
William Barr.”101 During his tenure as an immigration judge, Ford sparked
numerous complaints about his hostile and unfair conduct toward
noncitizens and lawyers who appeared before him.102
Ford’s most vocal critic was the National Lawyers Guild (NLG).103
The NLG submitted an eleven-page letter to the DOJ, followed by some
200 pages of additional materials, which sought to demonstrate Ford’s
unfitness. In particular, the letter had a dedicated section that discussed
Ford’s “aggressive, demeaning, and unprofessional [attitude] with [respect
to] counsel for simply fulfilling their ethical requirements of
representation.”104 As the NLG documented, Ford also sought to
intimidate lawyers who came before him by using berating and dismissive
language and even “implicitly threaten[ing]” them at times.105

99.
Id. at 221.
100.
See Immigration Judge, Subject of Complaint by Lawyers, Retires, ABC
NEWS (Apr. 18, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/immigrationjudge-subject-complaint-lawyers-retires-77140566 [https://perma.cc/32R2-MYL6].
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
See Nat’l Laws. Guild, Complaint Regarding San Francisco Immigration
Judge
Nicholas
R.
Ford
(Nov.
12,
2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tuNk_14qeGGNpgLOsOdbMRwGoKbgV2Ee/view
[https://perma.cc/45C6-GPBL].
104.
Id. at 5.
105.
Id. at 4–5.

2022:57

Overstepping: U.S. Immigration Judges

71

Perhaps most importantly, though, Ford appeared to view his
statutory powers as grants of unfettered authority.106 The NLG complaint
analyzed a number of instances in which Ford actively tried to “discredit”
expert witnesses and play “a prosecutorial role instead of an impartial
one.”107 In fact, Ford even went so far as to state to “another attorney that
he could ‘rule by fiat’ if he wanted.”108
Approximately five months after the NLG filed its complaint, Ford
retired from the bench.109 He did not address the charges against him.
Rather, his departure letter focused on the structural problems of the
immigration adjudication system, impliedly criticizing his DOJ higher-ups
for the manner in which they supervised their subordinate judges.110
In sum, these examples of judges behaving well beyond their
appropriated powers lead us to ask the following questions:
1. Are there other non-Article III judges who have a similar power
to develop the record?
2. If so, have the federal appellate courts compared these other
judges to immigration judges when examining the parameters of
this power?
3. Might this INA provision regarding judicial authority need to be
examined from a new perspective?
For each of these questions, the answer is yes.
II. DRAWING COMPARISONS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Even as certain federal appeals courts have admonished immigration
judges for overstepping, there continues to be strong support for upholding
the developing-the-record statute. In reviewing the caselaw, these courts
frequently reference how the Social Security Administration’s Office of
Hearings and Appeals functions. Twenty-five years ago, Jeffrey Wolfe and
Lisa Proszek wrote a rich and detailed article on the SSA’s adjudication
process.111 As they observed, “Overwhelmingly, the number of
106.
See id. at 4–6.
107.
Id. at 5.
108.
Id.
109.
See Immigration Judge, Subject of Complaint by Lawyers, Retires, supra
note 100.
110.
Id. (noting that Ford’s letter stated that his “managers [constituted] a fearful
community whose primary interest has never been the growth of those they oversee but
rather their continued employment”).
111.
Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal
Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial
Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 294 (1997) (“As of March, 1996, 1,310 Administrative Law
Judges and 33 Senior Administrative Law Judges served in various agencies of the United
States government; 1,060 (with 33 Senior Administrative Law Judges) with the Social
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proceedings before United States Administrative Law Judges
occur[red]”112 within the SSA forum. Today, the situation remains the
same. “There are nearly 2,000 ALJs employed by 28 agencies in the
federal government,”113 with “more than 1,500”114 of them working for the
SSA, who annually “render over 650,000 decisions at the hearing level.”115
Wolfe and Proszek’s account carefully explains the role of the judge
in an SSA hearing.116 To begin, the cases typically involve individuals
claiming benefits for issues relating to different disabilities they have and
for which they are seeking to receive assistance under the Social Security
Act.117 These matters can be extremely technical; not surprisingly, ALJs
rely upon experts to give specialized opinions.118
It is important to note that at the SSA hearing stage, claimants are
having their cases reviewed for the third time.119 During the first two
instances, the matter is not in front of a judge.120 Instead, up “[t]o that point
the individual has applied for benefits and has been denied by [a civil
servant in] the State Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) twice—
once initially, and again on reconsideration.”121 When a case reaches the

Security Administration. In the first quarter fiscal year 1997, a total of 518,862 Social
Security cases were pending, awaiting administrative hearing.”) (footnotes omitted).
112.
Id. at 294. For a valuable recent article on the SSA adjudication system and
its relevance to immigration adjudication, see Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus,
Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097
(2018).
113.
Jack Beermann, The Future of Administrative Law Judge Selection, REGUL.
REV.
(Oct.
29,
2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/10/29/beermannadministrative-law-judge-selection/ [https://perma.cc/2QVQ-4A9S].
114.
Information About SSA’s Hearings and Appeals Operations, SSA:
&
APPEALS,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_us.html
HEARINGS
[https://perma.cc/CLS6-FNUU] (last visited Jan. 28, 2022).
115.
Id.
116.
See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 294–95.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 295. The head of the SSA is known as the commissioner. This
individual, operating through the ALJ, has the burden of showing that the claimant is not
disabled and thus should not receive benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2020). If the
claimant proves the disability and inability to work in their previous job, the commissioner
has the burden of showing that there is “other work” the claimant can perform in order to
deny the benefit. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At this point experts frequently are called upon
to provide assistance to the ALJ. I am grateful to Sean Santen for his insights on these
points.
119.
Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 296 (noting that an ALJ hears and
reviews a case de novo).
120.
Id.
121.
Id. Note that, if the Commissioner is going to deny benefits, the statute
requires the SSA to compile all relevant medical records for at least the twelve months
prior to the point at which the application was filed. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(B)(5); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1512(b)(1) (2020). Again, thanks to Sean Santen for his insights on these points.
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ALJ, more than eighty percent of claimants have legal representation.122
This is significant because research has shown that in these forums,
“having a lawyer nearly doubled applicants’ chances of getting
benefits.”123 Furthermore, unlike in the immigration context, where the
government is represented by DHS prosecutors, in the SSA hearing, the
government is not present, having prevailed below.124 Thus, perhaps as a
way both to provide balance and to safeguard the interests of the
government, the Code of Federal Regulations gives the ALJ quite
sweeping powers:
A hearing is open to the parties and to other persons the
administrative law judge considers necessary and proper. At the
hearing, the administrative law judge looks fully into the issues,
questions . . . [the claimant] and the other witnesses, and . . .
[a]ccepts as evidence any documents that are material to the
issues[. Additionally, the ALJ] may stop the hearing temporarily
and continue it at a later date if he or she finds that there is
material evidence missing at the hearing[,] and may reopen the
hearing at any time before he or she mails a notice of the decision
in order to receive new and material evidence. The
administrative law judge may decide when the evidence will be
presented and when the issues will be discussed.125
Nevertheless, the claimant’s lawyer is still expected—and
empowered—to be a zealous advocate for the client.126 All of the features
that are found in a traditional litigation/courtroom context with respect to
the obligations of the “adversarial lawyer”127 are present in the SSA
hearing as well.128 Therefore, the difference between the traditional

122.
Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 295 (noting that this representation is
done “either by counsel or non-lawyer ‘representatives’”).
123.
Compare NOLO, Survey Statistics: Is a Social Security Disability Lawyer
Worth It?, DISABILITYSECRETS, https://www.disabilitysecrets.com/resources/surveystatistics-is-social-security-disability-lawyer-worth-it.html
[https://perma.cc/4JBVQNWG] (last visited Jan. 29, 2022) (“60% were ultimately approved for benefits,
compared to 34% of those who didn’t have a lawyer’s help.”), with U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-37, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY: ADDITIONAL
MEASURES AND EVALUATION NEEDED TO ENHANCE ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY OF
HEARINGS
DECISIONS
24
(2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-37.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HF2-6CMD] (finding that disability applicants who used either legal or
non-legal representatives were allowed benefits 2.9 times as often as those who did not).
124.
Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 295.
125.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (2020).
126.
See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 296–97.
127.
Id.
128.
For regulations governing ethics and conduct within the SSA hearing, see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1700–.1799 (2020). For the equivalent within the Executive Office for
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courtroom and the SSA hearing is really in the role played by the judge.
In the latter, the judge is expected to be affirmatively “active.”129
The SSA ALJ’s responsibilities as a fact finder130 resemble those of
judges in many civil law countries.131 As an “inquisitorial jurist,”132 the
ALJ questions, investigates, examines, and evaluates witnesses and finally
forms opinions based on the information, data, and evidence gathered.133
At the same time, there is an SSA regulation in place stating that the “judge
shall not conduct a hearing if he or she [or they] is prejudiced or partial
with respect to any party or has any interest in the matter pending for
decision.”134
Naturally, the query that emerges is whether these seemingly
opposing responsibilities can be reconciled.135 In his essay entitled “The
Adversary System,” Lon Fuller argued that the answer was a resounding

Immigration Review, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.101–.111 (2021). My thanks to Sean Santen for
his insights here.
129.
Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 297–99.
130.
Id. at 311, 314, 316, 326.
131.
For a discussion of this point, see HERBERT JACOB, ERHARD BLANKENBURG,
HERBERT M. KRITZER, DORIS MARIE PROVINE & JOSEPH SANDERS, COURTS, LAW, AND
POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1996).
132.
See generally Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 302–07 (explaining the
role of the “inquisitorial jurist” as “an ‘active’ participant in the solicitation of evidence
critical to the fact-finding process”).
133.
For a thoughtful summary of the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, see
RICHARD MURPHY & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:25
(3d ed. 2021) (“The administrative judge is pivotal to the fact-finding function of an
evidentiary hearing and hence, unlike a trial judge, an administrative judge has a wellestablished affirmative duty to develop the record. . . . Even in cases in which the claimant
is represented by counsel, the administrative judge has the ultimate duty to develop the
record fully and fairly. Administrative judges have an affirmative duty to elicit the facts
necessary to determine the interest of the public as well as the private parties. They must
develop a record comprehensive and accessible record [sic] so that the agency and
ultimately a court can review the whole case with minimal difficulty. . . . However an
administrative judge may not go too far. The administrative judge must not go so far in
developing the record so as to take on the aspects of a litigant with a decided point of view.
An active role does not mean that the administrative judge can take the place of a
witness.”).
134.
20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (2020). Somewhat curiously, the regulation initially
allows the ALJ to decide whether such prejudice exists. If the claimant loses on this point,
they may file an appeal. Id. (“If you object to the administrative law judge who will conduct
the hearing, you must notify the administrative law judge at your earliest opportunity. The
administrative law judge shall consider your objections and shall decide whether to proceed
with the hearing or withdraw. If he or she withdraws, the Associate Commissioner for
Hearings and Appeals, or his or her delegate, will appoint another administrative law judge
to conduct the hearing. If the administrative law judge does not withdraw, you may, after
the hearing, present your objections to the Appeals Council as reasons why the hearing
decision should be revised or a new hearing held before another administrative law
judge.”).
135.
See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 111, at 299–301, 310, 317, 329.
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“no.”136 For Fuller, the notion that the adjudicator could zealously and
copiously fact-find and concurrently stay neutral in the adjudication phase
was unrealistic.137 Further complications arise if the claimant’s lawyer
clashes with the judge while the judge is wearing their inquisitor’s hat.
When there is such a conflict, it is easy to imagine how the claimant’s
lawyer might receive retribution, for after all, it is the judge who also
wields the final decision-making power in the case.138
Still, despite this undeniable tension, the adjudication system within
the SSA remains. And all of this information is relevant for our current
immigration study. The reason is that the federal appellate courts, in
reviewing whether immigration judges have abused their power, have
routinely pointed to the SSA hearings as the prototype for how such
forums should operate. Recall, for example, Jacinto v. I.N.S., discussed
above. In ruling that the immigration judge exhibited bias and failed to
develop the record properly, the Ninth Circuit referenced ALJs in the SSA
context as the ideal model.139
136.
See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35
(Harold J. Berman ed., rev. ed. 1972).
137.
Id. at 36. Others over the years have also made the argument that the
inquisitorial system has a greater potential for bias than adversarial systems. See, e.g., John
Thibaut, Laurens Walker & E. Allan Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972); Rogelio A. Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone:
The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 479 (1995); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120 (1978).
Separately, but relatedly, some have criticized Fuller for his interpretation of how judges
apply law, particularly his description of the positivist school of thought on the matter. For
a powerful and persuasive critique, see Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in
Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (2011). For
another excellent analysis, see Leslie Green & Thomas Adams, Legal Positivism, STAN.
ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/
[https://perma.cc/VPP7-HXFY].
138.
For a discussion of how the ALJ must develop the record when a lawyer is
present or in pro se situations, see Jon C. Dubina, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The
Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative
Proceeding, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1302 nn.58–59 (1997) (citing for support Vaughn v.
Heckler, 741 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1984), Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224, 229 (3d
Cir. 1975), Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring),
Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561–62 (9th Cir. 1992), Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11
(2d Cir. 1990), and Currier v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 612 F.2d 594, 598 (1st
Cir. 1980)); Jennifer J. Dickinson, Square Pegs, Round Holes, and the Myth of
Misapplication: Issue Exhaustion and the Social Security Disability Benefits Process, 49
EMORY L.J. 957, 963–65 (2000); Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets
Goldberg: The Case for a Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L.
REV. 273, 336 n.201 (2009) (quoting Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir.
1980)).
139.
See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that these two
“administrative settings have the common feature of determining the applicant’s eligibility
for certain benefits” and how “both social security and deportation hearings are likely to
be unfamiliar settings for the applicant,” which requires that the judge fairly and justly look
out for the interests of the party seeking redress).
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Other federal appellate courts have made similar observations. In
Yang v. McElroy,140 the Second Circuit heard a case involving a Chinese
citizen who claimed that he would be subject to persecution based on
protests and anti-government activities he organized as a student in Fujian,
China.141 The immigration judge ordered him removed for failing to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution, and the BIA affirmed.142 The
Second Circuit, however, remanded the case for further investigation.143
In doing so, it directed the BIA (and, implicitly, the immigration judge) to
study the ALJ context to best determine how an asylum proceeding should
properly function.144
The Sixth Circuit has also found comparability between the two
forums. In Mendoza-Garcia v. Barr,145 the court upheld an order by an
immigration judge who ruled against a Guatemalan citizen’s petition for
asylum and withholding of removal.146 In rendering its judgment, the Sixth
Circuit explained that it “ha[d] fleshed out the duty to develop the record
in the context of social security hearings,” implicitly suggesting that
because the duty was appropriate there, it was acceptable in immigration
cases as well.147
And the Fourth Circuit, too, has explicitly recognized “the duties of
immigration judges to be analogous to those of Social Security
administrative law judges.”148 Indeed, the court has even gone further. It
has declared that within its circuit, “immigration judges are charged with
a duty to fully develop the record in all cases before them,” including when
claimants have lawyers.149
Thus, although the Supreme Court has yet to opine on the comparison
between the two proceedings, several circuit courts have. Unfortunately,
however, these courts have failed to critically analyze the issues inherent
in obliging the immigration judge to be both a fact finder and neutral
arbiter. Instead, the immigration judge’s bifurcated role is simply accepted
and, furthermore, deemed valuable for the immigration adjudication

140.
277 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2002).
141.
Id. at 160–61.
142.
Id. at 161.
143.
Id. at 162–63.
144.
Id. at 162.
145.
918 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2019).
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 504–05. This case is also discussed in Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d
612, 623–25 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[O]ther circuits, while not explicitly drawing analogies
between the immigration and Social Security contexts, have relied on Jacinto, Yang, and
Richardson in recognizing immigration judges’ duty to develop the record.”) (citations
omitted).
148.
See Quintero, 998 F.3d at 626.
149.
Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
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process.150 Yet the inherent conflict at play when an “inquisitorial judge”
presides over immigration cases should be a matter of serious public
concern—one that deserves enhanced scrutiny.
III. LAWYER OPT-OUT WITH DISCRETIONARY EVALUATION (LODE)
A. Placing the LODE Model Within the Literature
One way to help correct the imbalance present within immigration
court proceedings would be to allow the noncitizen’s lawyer to serve as a
check on the immigration judge. This idea of the empowered lawyer has
its roots in a larger literature that dates back many decades. Over one
hundred years ago, for example, Louis Brandeis published a lecture he
gave calling upon lawyers to be forceful litigators against big
businesses.151 As Brandeis noted then, “We hear much of the ‘corporation
lawyer,’ and far too little of the ‘people’s lawyer.’”152 Subsequent
scholarship documented changes to the legal and political landscapes
sparked by lawyers willing to challenge the institutional status quo.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, for instance, Willard Hurst published
three landmark books on how “law and social process” in the United States
had evolved because of the role lawyers played within the courts and
within society writ large.153 And around this same period, Clement Vose
wrote his famous account of the NAACP lawyers who strategically and
aggressively used the courts to advance the cause of civil rights.154
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, various works began to ask
whether lawyers were hijacking the litigation movement for their own selfinterested purposes.155 Too often, as different studies pointed out,
individual clients or rank-and-file members of social movements were

150.
151.

Mendoza-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2019).
See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS––A
PROFESSION 313, 321–27 (1914).
152.
Id. at 321.
153.
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY (1960); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950). For a critical review of Hurst’s scholarship,
see Stephen Diamond, Legal Realism and Historical Method: J. Willard Hurst and
American Legal History, 77 MICH. L. REV. 784 (1979).
154.
See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE
NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES (1959).
155.
For an overview of this point, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:
PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); Michael McCann
& Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law’s “Allurement,” in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold eds., 1998); see also SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE
RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984).
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disregarded by the lawyers who represented them.156 One of the most
famous critiques came from Derrick Bell, who argued that lawyers hyperemphasized both courtroom litigation and the acquisition of rights on
paper.157 Reflecting on the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education,158
Bell suggested that more focus and resources needed to be devoted to
substantively aiding the educational experience and overall educational
enterprise for Black children.159
In response to Bell and others, several writers, particularly during the
1990s and into the 2000s, sought to rebut this perspective with research
findings of their own. Notably, Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold were
two prominent leaders in an emerging field that took a more “protean and
heterogeneous”160 view as to how such activist-lawyers operated.161 As
they contended, lawyers who affirmatively opted to embrace the passions
and political positions of their clients needed to be thought of as “cause
lawyers,” or advocates whose professional obligations and personal
commitments to the issues on which they worked were inseparable.162
Two key contributors who worked with Sarat and Scheingold focused
their efforts on immigration cause lawyering. Susan Sterrett examined
156.
See, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J.
1049, 1061–63 (1970); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 31–32 (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S
LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 32–33 (1982).
157.
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
158.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159.
Bell, supra note 157, at 512–16. For other researchers who have expressed
skepticism of lawyer-led, rights-based campaigns, see GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid
for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 281 (1982); Peter Gabel & Duncan
Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1984); Neal Milner, The Dilemmas
of Legal Mobilization: Ideologies and Strategies of Mental Patient Liberation Groups, 8
LAW & POL’Y 105 (1986); Nikolas Rose, Unreasonable Rights: Mental Illness and the
Limits of Law, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y 199 (1985); GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); MARY ANN GLENDON, A
NATION UNDER LAWYERS 270–72 (1994).
160.
See STUART SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN:
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 2, 4 (2004).
161.
Id. at 2–4. Note that the cause-lawyer school emerged in part as a response
to William Simon’s classic article that argued for zealous lawyer advocacy while
simultaneously asking the lawyer to stay neutral, above the fray, and dispassionate. See
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
162.
See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 160, at 2–4. These two scholars
published a series of cause lawyering volumes. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 155; CAUSE LAWYERING
AND THE STATE IN THE GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); THE
WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin
Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
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how immigration lawyers played a counter-balancing role to judges who
frequently took hostile positions toward the immigrants appearing before
them.163 And Susan Coutin highlighted the ways immigration lawyers
“sought legal recognition of their clients’ realities” by confronting
aggressive judicial authority within the courtroom and engaging in legal
awareness advocacy outside of it.164
Moreover, separate from Sarat and Scheingold’s project, Marisol
Orihuela recently has written on immigration lawyering specifically in the
area of “crimmigration.”165 As Orihuela puts it, “For too long, lawyering
theory has treated . . . [immigration] and criminal lawyering as wholly
distinct areas of practice.”166 Orihuela draws upon and then synthesizes
different strands of scholarship from these two fields to craft a
sophisticated approach immigration lawyers can use to meet both the
institutional challenges they face in court and what “is happening in
residential neighborhoods and workplaces when raids are executed with
the cooperation of local law enforcement cooperation.”167
The LODE model fits within—and adds another layer to—these
studies. The model places those clients who have lawyers in a relatively
better position vis-à-vis the government than they were in before. And it

163.
See Susan Sterett, Caring About Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering
in Britain, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 155, at 293 (focusing her study on the situation of members
of the U.K.’s South Asian community, who, despite often losing in court, nevertheless had
strong lawyers advocating on their behalf and taking their claims outside of the
courtroom—to Parliament and the media).
164.
See Susan Bibler Coutin, Cause Lawyering in the Shadow of the State: A
U.S. Immigration Example, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN THE GLOBAL ERA,
supra note 162, at 117, 132–36. For a comparative example, see Stephen Meili, U.K.
Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of International
Human Rights Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1123 (2013).
165.
Marisol Orihuela, Crim-Imm Lawyering, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 613 (2020).
166.
Id. at 661; see also Kit Johnson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal
Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 863 (2015) (providing further
insights into lawyering theory treating criminal and immigration lawyering as distinct areas
of practice).
167.
See Orihuela, supra note 165, at 662. Note that throughout the article,
Orihuela deftly highlights how scholarship on community lawyering, movement
lawyering, lawyering and social movements, criminal defense lawyering, and public
interest lawyering all have a crucial role to play in understanding the complicated nature
of crim-imm lawyering in today’s political environment. Orihuela, supra note 165.
Additionally, an important part of her research emphasizes the work of Scott Cummings
and Ingrid Eagly, two scholars who work in the public interest and crimmigration spaces.
See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering,
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645 (2017); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National
Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing
the importance of lawyers in the immigration courtroom setting).
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helps provide a modicum of much-needed integrity to a process that most
attuned observers view with both skepticism and frustration.168
B. Operationalizing the LODE Approach
For years, there have been calls on Congress to move the immigration
courts out of the Department of Justice.169 This author’s own work has
strongly supported this position as well.170 At the same time, the reality is
that there is little likelihood that a mass overhaul of the immigration
adjudication process will occur in the near future. Accordingly, the
question to ask, as it relates to the issue of immigration judging, is whether
the system can be improved—even partly.
The LODE model offers one such step in this direction. Recall the
INA’s provision, §240(b)(1), which is at the heart of the debate here:
The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence,
and interrogate, examine, and cross‑examine the [noncitizen]
and any witnesses. The immigration judge may issue subpoenas
for the attendance of witnesses and presentation of evidence.
The immigration judge shall have authority (under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General) to sanction by civil money
penalty any action (or inaction) in contempt of the judge’s
proper exercise of authority under this chapter.171
As we have seen, the federal courts of appeals have uniformly held
that this provision requires that the immigration judge look after the
interests of noncitizens who appear pro se.172 But where counsel is present,
under the LODE approach the lawyer would take the lead.
How might this model play out if it were adopted? Consider several
scenarios in which this proposal could improve immigration adjudication.
Scenario One: A noncitizen is represented by a competent lawyer
who is—in the famous words of Marc Galanter—a “repeat player.”173 The
lawyer here would be one who works in the immigration courts frequently
and is both experienced and well-regarded within the legal community. In
this situation, the lawyer would be extremely familiar with how best to
present and defend the noncitizen’s case.
168.
For a study that directly and squarely calls into question the independence
of the immigration judge, see Lilibet Artola, In Search of Uniformity: Applying the Federal
Rules of Evidence in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (2012).
169.
For a review of many of these works, see Krishnan, supra note 3, at 325–28.
170.
Id.
171.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1).
172.
See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
173.
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
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Moreover, the lawyer would have fully developed the record on
behalf of the noncitizen in preparation for the hearing. Additionally,
assume that the presiding immigration judge has a reputation for being
hostile to noncitizen claims and for using § 240(b)(1) as a means to
undermine the sought-after relief.174 (This hostility may come from the
judge being generally a hostile person or from political pressure placed
upon the judge—or both.) The LODE approach would allow for the
lawyer, under these circumstances, to opt out of having the judge develop
the record. In other words, the lawyer would be saying something to the
effect of, “I can handle this matter; we’re good. No need, Judge X, for your
assistance here. Thank you, though.”
Scenario Two: Assume that the lawyer in this situation is the same
lawyer present in the first scenario. The difference, however, is that the
judge here is not hostile, but is instead fair and equitable, willing to
thoughtfully consider the noncitizen’s petition. Under these facts, if the
lawyer seeks to opt out of having the judge serve as the main inquisitor,
ideally the “fair judge” should graciously accede. And it makes sense why
the judge would do so. After all, the “fair judge” should have confidence
that this talented lawyer would represent the client’s interests in a
competent fashion and be able to rebut the government’s case when
needed.
The proposition that the judge would place such trust in the lawyer,
and potentially even be susceptible to the ensuing advocacy, draws upon
the classic work of Charles Epp in the 1990s.175 Epp examined judicial
systems within democratic societies that had litigators skilled in
strategizing and promoting their clients’ interests. As Epp found, the
presiding judges who heard these cases often followed the lead of these
advocates who came before them.176 Under scenario two, the LODE
approach envisions something similar—namely, an effective and
competent lawyer advocating on behalf of the noncitizen’s interests while
the fair judge wears the hat of the contemplative decision-maker, open to
hearing the claims the lawyer is making.177

174.
For a discussion of immigration judges who have a propensity to act in this
type of “harsh” manner against noncitizen claims, see David Hausman, The Failure of
Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1179–80 (2016).
175.
See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
176.
Id. Indeed, Epp focuses on four such democratic societies: Britain, Canada,
India, and the United States. As he shows, even in an “inhospitable environment,” such as
Britain, where judges historically have proven to be very conservative, such judges can be
persuadable if there is a strong “support structure for legal mobilization,” including a
coordinated, bottom-up campaign of lawyers who work toward a common goal in a
strategic fashion. Id. at 119–20, 138–41, 145.
177.
See supra notes 154, 159–63 and accompanying text.
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Scenario Three: In this situation, suppose the lawyer is ineffective,
incompetent, or unable to represent the noncitizen in an adequate manner.
Note that in a recent, large-scale empirical study, this author examined
1,615 BIA cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel.178 The
standard by which ineffective lawyering is typically evaluated by the
immigration courts focuses on whether the legal advice was “‘deficient’
in nature” and whether the representation “resulted in prejudice to the
noncitizen.”179 For analytical purposes here, the LODE model adopts this
definition of ineffective lawyering.180
Now, suppose that the judge is fair and has a reputation for being
thoughtful and impartial. Under this scenario, allowing only the lawyer to
develop the record would work a disservice to the noncitizen. The LODE
approach thus would embrace interpreting § 240(b)(1) to allow for the
judge to intervene under certain conditions.
Specifically, this approach would look to a process used in civil
procedure law as a type of analog. In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) states,
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he [she or they] shall so
state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the
order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless

178.
See Krishnan, supra note 12.
179.
Id. (manuscript at 13) (discussing the influence of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) on In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988)); see also Michael
S. Vastine, Is Your Client Prejudiced? Litigating Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims
in Immigration Matters Arising in the Eleventh Circuit, 62 U. MIA. L. REV. 1063, 1067–68
(2008) (explaining the elements of what makes counsel “effective” under the Sixth
Amendment).
180.
Typically, ineffective counsel manifests in immigration court in two ways:
failure to produce necessary evidence and failure to pursue a legal avenue or argue a viable
legal theory that might bring about relief for the client. My thanks to Sean Santen for noting
these points and, regarding the latter, for highlighting how in the asylum context ineffective
assistance could specifically manifest in the lawyer failing to properly categorize the
noncitizen as a member of a “particular social group”—which could be the basis for
relief—if there was a well-founded fear of persecution by having such membership.
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the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall
so order.181
That is, during a civil action in which a federal district court judge
believes that an important, outstanding “question of law”182 needs to be
resolved because it could hasten “the ultimate termination of the
litigation,” the judge may request that the federal circuit court of appeals
hear the matter.183
The LODE approach proposes something similar with respect to
scenario three. In this case, where the fair immigration judge believes that
judicial intervention to develop the record is necessary to correct
ineffective or incompetent lawyering, the judge would ask the overseeing
federal circuit court of appeals to affirm this request.184 A requirement that
an independent Article III court review and approve this matter would give
“cover” and legitimacy to the immigration judge if the request were

181.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
182.
Id.
183.
Id. For one scholar who has contributed significantly to the literature on this
statutory provision, see Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the Scope of
Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809 (2018); Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards,
and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 (2013); Bryan
Lammon, Cumulative Finality, 52 GA. L. REV. 767 (2018); and Bryan Lammon, Dizzying
Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure
of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 371 (2017). See also Andrew
S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1650 (2011) (discussing the problems inherent in
the absence of “appellate jurisdiction over most interlocutory [multidistrict litigation]
orders”); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237,
1238–39 (2007) (highlighting the lack of reform––despite mounting criticism––of the
“prevailing doctrine on appellate jurisdiction”).
184.
Admittedly, the interlocutory aspect provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is in
place primarily to decide an issue pending in front of the district court so that there is not
a need to wait until a final judgment before an appeal can be launched. Under the LODE
approach, the variation is that the immigration judge would be affirmatively seeking
advice, approval, and authorization to develop the record, most likely during the course of
the immigration proceeding, as a result of witnessing the inadequate lawyering. The
parallel between the two, however, is still present in that there is a request for the Article
III appellate court to help resolve an issue at a lower court level so that that lower court
proceeding can move forward in as expeditious and fair a manner as possible.
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granted.185 Additionally, having this safeguard in place would provide a
check on a hostile judge who wishes to exert unwarranted authority.186
Scenario Four: This last situation presupposes the presence of a
lawyer who is like the one in scenario three (incompetent and ineffective)
and a judge who is similar to the adjudicator from scenario one (hostile
and aggressive). If the LODE approach were in place, it would be unlikely
that this type of lawyer would want, request, or even know about the optout provision. Similarly, it would not be surprising for this type of judge
to heap scorn and hostility upon the poorly represented noncitizen. As
such, the question is whether the LODE model would help the noncitizen
here.

185.
In addition to referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) as a comparative baseline,
there are other analogs that are useful to consider. For example, under United States
Supreme Court Rule 19,
1. A United States court of appeals may certify to th[e] Court a question or
proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a
case. The certificate shall contain a statement of the nature of the case and the
facts on which the question or proposition of law arises. Only questions or
propositions of law may be certified, and they shall be stated separately and
with precision.
SUP. CT. R. 19; see also Bennett Evan Cooper, Certification of Questions of Law to State
Supreme
Courts,
REUTERS
(June
22,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/certification-questions-law-state-supremecourts-2021-06-22/ (noting two key points: first, that “many [federal] courts are turning to
[the] . . . states’ high courts [for] the final say [on] state law” questions that come before
them; and, second, that, “[w]hile the state court’s opinion is binding precedent as to state
law—the same as if it had been issued in a different case—and may, under state
certification rules, be res judicata as to the parties—the federal court enters judgment as a
matter of its own authority under federal law. . . [and that] certification is a creature of state
statutes and court rules, not federal law; federal courts simply decide whether to avail
themselves of this resource”); Margaret A. Upshaw, The Unappealing State of Certificates
of Appealability, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1609 (2015) (discussing, in part, how under the 1996
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a district court or a federal circuit court of
appeals could rule against a defendant on a habeas claim but then issue a certificate of
appealability to allow for the respective higher court to weigh in on a constitutional claim
that is raised). Although not perfect analogs, each of these comparators nevertheless
suggests that the LODE approach’s proposal that an immigration judge look to the federal
circuit court of appeals for advice and approval is neither extraordinary nor unreasonable.
I am grateful to Tung Yin for his advice on these points.
186.
A question that may immediately be raised is why a hostile judge would
simply not repeatedly request circuit approval to be able to intervene. There are two
reasons. First, immigration judges are completely overwhelmed with cases. See C.J.L.G.
v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 636 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring). Given the limited amount
of time they have currently, it is hard to imagine that, under most circumstances, these
judges—even hostile ones—would needlessly spend time filing for such permission unless
they truly believed it was warranted. Second, filing frivolous or what might be seen as
politically motivated, vindictive petitions could eventually result in harsh rebuke from the
circuit courts, costing the immigration judge important social capital and the ability to hear
certain cases if the circuit courts deemed it necessary. See supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
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On the one hand, the answer is no; the noncitizen’s disadvantaged
position is not improved to the extent that we see it occurring in the other
scenarios. At the same time, however, this approach does not put the
noncitizen in a worse off position than the current status quo, which is
important to note. Moreover, if the immigration courts adopted and
followed the LODE model, even in scenario four we might see a broader
cultural change eventually occurring.
For example, assume that the LODE approach becomes the prevailing
operating framework. If the noncitizen were to lose at the immigration
court but gain new counsel on appeal who would argue that the initial
lawyer was inadequate and the presiding immigration judge was hostile,
in that situation it would not be unreasonable to expect the federal
appellate court to more closely scrutinize such a claim. After all, the
appellate court would be working under a model in which it would already
have enhanced responsibility. If, on appeal, this noncitizen were to allege
malpractice by the lawyer and the immigration judge, and if the LODE
approach were in place, the federal appellate court may well be
conditioned to take a closer look at the claim than it otherwise might under
the present system.
The LODE approach thus offers a new way to imagine how
immigration hearings could occur. The approach provides more balance to
what is currently a highly imbalanced process. Figure 1 visually
summarizes the theoretical model proposed here.
Fair Judge
Competent,
Effective Lawyer
Incompetent,
Ineffective Lawyer

Lawyer Allowed to
Opt Out (Benefit to
Noncitizen)
Judges Use
Discretion to
Intervene Contingent
upon Fed. Cir. Court
Approval (Benefit to
Noncitizen)

Hostile Judge
Lawyer Allowed to
Opt Out (Benefit to
Noncitizen)
Status Quo but
Possibly Greater
Scrutiny by a Fed.
Cir. Court (Potential
Benefit to Noncitizen)

Figure 1. Lawyer Opt-Out with Discretionary Evaluation Model (LODE)
In three of the four scenarios, the LODE approach offers an
immediate, tangible benefit to the noncitizen. And in the fourth scenario,
the model leaves the noncitizen no worse off than the noncitizen is under
the status quo.
There is an additional point to be made. Recall that the Introduction
referenced that the judge would not be precluded from asking clarifying
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questions when needed. Under the LODE approach, the factual
development of the record would be in the hands of the lawyer, while the
model would allow for the judge to inquire so long as the intervention was
on matters of law. Indeed, even if the lawyer believed that the judge’s
queries crossed the line into substantive development of the record, the
presumption, under these narrow circumstances, would be in favor of the
judge—for two reasons: First, the lawyer could always object on the
record and then raise this issue on appeal, arguing that the judge
overstepped and violated the LODE rules by improperly seeking to
factually develop the record. Second, just from a practical perspective, it
would not be feasible to expect the judge to obtain appellate approval
every time the judge felt it necessary to clarify a legal question.
To summarize, then, consider the following example, which provides
a brief review. Lawyer, L, has a well-regarded reputation for being highly
skilled, talented, and attentive to client needs. L is appearing in front of an
immigration judge who is considered to be an open and just adjudicator.
The LODE model would deem L to be “competent/effective” and the IJ to
be “fair.” For this paired set, L would be able to opt out of having the IJ
develop the record on behalf of the client.
But what if the IJ genuinely believed that L was acting in a reckless
and incompetent fashion and thought that the only way to safeguard the
client’s interests would be to affirmatively invoke INA § 240(b)(1) and
thereby fully and factually develop the record? And what if L honestly
believed that if the IJ were to intervene, it would amount to a hostile and
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abusive exercise of judicial power? 187 What should be done in this
circumstance?188
Remember, built into the LODE model is the safety valve of looking
to the appropriate federal appellate court for approval and guidance at
certain times. If L decides not to object to having the IJ involved in
developing the record, nothing would be done; the IJ could intervene as
much or as little as they would like. If, however, L wishes to opt out of
having this judicial intervention, L could indicate this preference either
before or once the proceeding began.189 At this point, if the IJ insisted on
intervening, the IJ would need to file a request with the federal appellate
court stating why L was not properly addressing the client’s interests. L
187.
I am grateful to Tung Yin and Jeff Stake for helping me think through this
aspect of the LODE model—namely, how it needed to consider the fact that the descriptors
of the lawyer and judge in Figure 1 may not necessarily be binary. Relatedly, there is the
question of what the standard of review ought to be when the noncitizen appeals and claims
that there was excessive interference by the immigration judge (or perhaps not enough).
As the Supreme Court discussed in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,
The answer to the “proper standard” question may turn on practical
considerations, such as whether the question primarily “require[s] courts to
expound on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal
standard” (often calling for review de novo), or rather ‘immerse[s] courts in
case-specific factual issues’ (often calling for deferential review).
140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020) (citing U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct.
960, 967 (2018)). Note that as it relates to mixed questions of law and fact, GuerreroLasprilla did “not directly address the standards of review in judicial review of removal
orders . . . .” Am. Immigr. Council, Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr: Implications for Judicial
Review
4
n.4
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/guerrer
o-lasprilla_v_barr_implications_for_judicial_review.pdf [https://perma.cc/FG5E-DHTL].
But since “the Court interpreted application of law to established facts as encompassed in
questions of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), [in Guerrero-Lasprilla,] such questions
[were] subject to de novo review.” Id.
188.
Back in the late 1990s, Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey wrote a powerful
book on “legal consciousness” with a particular emphasis on “how legality is experienced
and understood by ordinary people as they engage, avoid, or resist the law and legal
meanings.” See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMONPLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 35 (1998). Their investigation led them to describe how law can
shape and influence reality, but also how it can be shaped and influenced by the reality
within which it operates. Given the authors’ explicit interests, lawyers and judges were not
a central focus. Nevertheless, what can be exported from their study to the LODE analysis
is how they describe law as being constitutive. Id. at 34–35. Thus, under Ewick and Silbey’s
framework, it would hardly be extraordinary to observe that the self-perceptions of the
immigration judge and the lawyer regarding who best is able to develop the record might
be different from how they see each other’s ability to properly perform this task. In
addition, the reputation of these actors also may not necessarily be binary; how they are
perceived within the broader community may vary depending on who is being asked.
189.
In order to avoid potentially angering the IJ, the protocol would be that the
lawyer would just need to check an opt-out box on a form the DOJ would make available
to the lawyer. The lawyer would not need to provide a reason because there might be a risk
that the judge could take offense, which could adversely affect the noncitizen client.
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would then have an opportunity to reply, and the court would decide
employing a de novo standard of review. (Requiring this standard would
be important because it would provide external validation, greater
integrity, and legitimacy to the process.190)
Finally, there may be some who ask whether it is too cumbersome a
task to mandate that the immigration judge first go to the appellate court
before being able to intervene. For those judges who are fair and
committed to ensuring that there is due process for every noncitizen, this
is unlikely to be the case. Admittedly, however, for immigration judges
who may be fair but lack motivation, it is possible that they could be
discouraged from asserting themselves because they feel that this step is
too onerous. But this latter situation has to be measured against the true
number of instances in which a noncitizen actually has an inept lawyer,
which would trigger the judge to act. As one recent study points out, in the
vast majority of cases, lawyers for noncitizens tend to be serving their
clients’ needs in an appropriate fashion.191 Hence, placing the onus on the
immigration judge to seek appellate approval does not seem overly
burdensome on balance.
***
If adopted, the LODE model would have the potential to change the
institutional culture of how immigration judging is conducted and how the
federal circuit courts of appeals evaluate that judging.
CONCLUSION: LAWYERS MATTER—AND THEY SHOULD
The discussion above has sought to place into context the positive
role lawyers can play in the immigration adjudication process. Although
immigration judges have received the imprimatur of the federal courts to
intervene during a pro se immigration hearing, the question as to what their
role should be when a noncitizen has a lawyer has not yet been definitively
resolved. This Article has argued that because of the way the immigration
court system is structured—the noncitizen faces embedded
disadvantages—having the lawyer take the lead on developing the record

190.
It is important to note that, for the LODE model, the default of whether the
judge should be able to intervene is a de novo standard of review. However, it is true that
this question may involve both a legal standard (i.e., whether the lawyer is competent or
not) and a factual one, namely, what facts prompt the judge to seek this permission. In
circumstances such as these, the actual standard of review might vary. The general
presumption is that if the record is tilted more in favor of law than fact, a de novo standard
of review should be followed. But where the appellate court is reviewing a record of
primarily fact-based issues raised by the judge with little law, the court may be inclined to
give more deference to the judge, notwithstanding any rebuttal that the lawyer may offer.
For a discussion of this point, see United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.
1984) (en banc). I am grateful to Tung Yin for his observations on this part of the model.
191.
See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 167, at 2.
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is of paramount importance, especially for those who hope to improve
current conditions.
The specific approach promoted here—the Lawyer Opt-Out with
Discretionary Evaluation model—is one that is purposely lawyer-centric.
It builds upon prior research showing how extremely crucial having a
lawyer can be for claimants appearing in front of a judge.192 In their
investigation of over a million removal cases,193 Eagly and Shafer note that
“immigrants with attorneys fared far better: among similarly situated
removal respondents, the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants
with representation, as opposed to those without, sought relief, and fiveand-a-half times greater that they obtained relief from removal.”194 What
the LODE approach does is to work under the premise that, more often
than not, the lawyer will indeed be acting in the best interests of the client.
As a result, the model privileges the lawyer as the primary figure who
should be in charge of developing the record during a proceeding.
There is, of course, a natural question many observers may raise:
What authority might make this theoretical construct a reality? One clear
method would be for Congress to pass legislation codifying the LODE
approach. Such a statute also could delegate the regulatory particulars to
the Justice Department. Still, as history has shown, passing any type of
federal immigration statute has proven to be immensely difficult over the
years.195
Consequently, a second method might be for the BIA (or the attorney
general directly) to issue a precedential decision adopting the elements set
forth in the LODE model. From there, assuming that this decision were
reviewed on appeal, a federal appellate court would decide whether
interpreting INA § 240(b)(1) through the LODE approach was acceptable.
To be sure, “the federal judiciary has continued to rely on the Supreme
Court’s 1984 Chevron precedent [of showing agency deference] when
examining [statutory interpretation] rulings issued by the BIA.”196 Still, it
may be a stretch to expect any federal circuit court of appeals to embrace
a BIA judgment that there must be Article III appellate approval before an
immigration judge can intervene to develop the record.

192.
See id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
See Krishnan, supra note 3, at 325–28.
196.
See Jayanth K. Krishnan, The ‘Impractical and Anomalous’ Consequences
of Territorial Inequity, 36 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming 2022). Under Chevron, the first
step is to look at whether the statute is unambiguous; if so, that stops any further analysis.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). If there
is ambiguity, however, it is the court’s responsibility to determine whether the agency’s
interpretation was a permissible construction of the statute. Id. For a recent example of the
Supreme Court showing Chevron deference in an immigration setting, see Scialabba v.
Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014).
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That then leaves one other possibility: the Supreme Court. The Court
could step in and resolve the question whether the immigration judge
should be able to develop the record when a noncitizen is represented by
counsel. If the Court were to enter the debate, the LODE model might
serve as a useful reference point for the Justices in setting forth, say,
“instructions of conduct” on this question for both immigration judges and
the federal appellate courts.
Ultimately, the hope is that this Article will prompt a broader inquiry
into what the role of the judge should be during an immigration hearing.
As the law currently stands, the immigration judge wields enormous,
almost unfettered power. That the immigration judge belongs to the same
branch of government to which immigration prosecutors are a part further
accentuates the already glaring disadvantages the noncitizen faces. And
while the ideal would be to create an immigration adjudication system with
the same character and independence as, say, Article III (or even Article
I) courts, the reality is that few observers are holding their breath in
anticipation of this type of reform coming soon. That is not to say,
however, that meaningful change cannot still occur. Allowing for
competent lawyers to take the lead in developing the record on behalf of
their clients is one such step that could significantly improve the status
quo.

